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I estimate the effect of allowing individuals to use socioeconomic conditions to qualify for
disability benefits on the labor supply of older men in Canada. I obtain my estimates using a
difference−in−difference approach and I also adjust my standard errors to properly account
for the sampling variability in the data. I find that this policy change led to a 1.5 percentage
increase in the nonparticipation of older men (aged 45 to 64) in the CPP provinces, relative to
Quebec where there was no change in eligibility requirements.
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Most of the research examining the effects of disability programs on the labor 
supply of older men have emphasized the effects of benefits on labor supply decisions 
(see Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for a survey). Recently, Autor and Duggan (2003) 
suggested that the interaction of more generous benefits with looser screening 
requirements could combine with fewer opportunities for low-skilled workers and result 
in an increase in the number of applications for disability benefits from displaced 
workers. In fact, Autor and Duggan (2003) found that the greater availability of disability 
benefits after 1984 have contributed to a 0.5 percentage point drop in the unemployment 
for low-skilled workers between 1984 and 1998. In addition, Gruber and Kubik (2001) 
examined the effects of disability insurance denial rates on nonparticipation decisions and 
found that a 10 percent increase in denial rates would lead to 2.8 percent reduction in 
nonparticipation. These estimates suggest that changes in screening stringency might also 
influence the labor supply decisions of individuals. 
 
In this paper, I will examine the effect of a change in the eligibility criteria in the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) disability program on the labor force participation 
of older men (aged 45 to 64). In particular, the CPP program allowed socioeconomic 
conditions such as the unemployment rate or the lack of particular jobs in a region to be 
used to determine eligibility for benefits. My empirical strategy (i.e., a difference-in-
difference estimator) exploits the fact that the CPP and QPP programs are separately 
administered. In particular, the QPP did not implement the change in eligibility criteria 
adopted by the CPP program. This means there will be cross-sectional and time series 
variation in the eligibility criteria used by these programs that will make it easier to 
separate the effect of the policy change from unobserved time effects. This is not possible 
in other countries (for example, the United States) since their disability insurance 
programs are centrally administered and have no cross-sectional variation in the 
eligibility rules. Consequently, the estimates from Canada can provide valuable 
information for other jurisdictions. In addition, a number of recent papers have noted (for 
example, Donald and Lang (2001) and Wooldridge (2003)) that the standard errors for 
difference-in-difference estimators may understate the sampling variability in the data. 
As a result, these papers have suggested some alternative approaches for computing the 
appropriate standard errors. I use an approach proposed by Wooldridge (2003) to obtain 
my estimates. 
 
In the next section I provide some background information on the on the policy 
change. I then describe my empirical strategy and present my empirical results. I 
conclude the paper with some summary remarks. 
 
2. Description of Canada /Quebec Pension Disability Program 
 
The C/QPP disability program provides disability insurance benefits to persons 
who have a prolonged mental or physical disability and also satisfy the contribution 
  1 requirements to the program, which provide a measure of attachment to the labor force.
1 
As noted earlier, these programs are separately administered: the QPP program only 
covers individuals in the province of Quebec and the CPP program covers individuals in 
the rest of Canada. This difference in administrative structure is beneficial since I can use 
the QPP program as a ‘control’ group when evaluating the effects of a ‘treatment’, i.e., a 
change in disability policy, in the rest of Canada. 
 
 The focus of the paper is a change in CPP disability program’s eligibility criteria 
in 1989. Specifically, the CPP program permitted the use of socioeconomic conditions 
such as high regional unemployment, a person’s skills and the lack of particular sorts of 
jobs in a region to qualify for CPP disability benefits (Canada Pension Plan Consultations 
(1996)).
2 In contrast, the QPP program maintained eligibility based solely on medical 
criteria. 
  
This change resulted from the appeal of a rejected claim in 1998, which is 
referred to as the Leduc decision. In its decision the Appeals Board for the CPP disability 
program ruled that socioeconomic and economic conditions could be used as mitigating 
factors when adjudicating applications for CPP disability benefits (Torjman (2002)). In 
order to make its adjudication process consistent with the Appeals Board decisions, 
HRDC issued an policy directive in 1989 that allowed for the consideration of these 
factors when reviewing applications. Since the Appeals Board is an independent body 
this suggests that plausible exogeneity of the policy change in 1989. 
 
By allowing socioeconomic conditions to determine eligibility for disability 
benefits the CPP program allowed for the possibility that some of its beneficiaries may 
have been able to work, but unable to find work. Although the replacement rates for 
disability benefits are much lower than those for unemployment insurance, the disability 
benefits would not be of limited duration, providing much longer term income support. In 
addition, at the time these changes in eligibility criteria were implemented reassessments 
of disability beneficiaries were not very common (HRDC (1996)), which further 
increases the likelihood that beneficiaries who were not truly disabled could use the 
program as a long-term income support program. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy  
 
I use data from 1987 to 1991 that was drawn from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), which is an annual supplement to the Labor Force Survey that is 
collected in April, to estimate the effect of the policy change using a difference-in-
difference estimator. This method involves a comparison of the change in behavior 
outside of Quebec, where the eligibility criteria were changed, with the change in 
behavior in Quebec, where the eligibility criteria were unchanged. I use 1987 and 1998 as 
                                                 
1 During the period covered by my study, the CPP program required contributions in 2 of the last 3 years or 
5 of the last 10 years. The QPP program required contributions in 5 of the last 10 years or one third of the 
contribution period. 
2 In addition, the CPP disability program also changed its definition of the ability to work from ‘any’ job to 
‘current’ job (Human Resources Development Canada  (1996); Canada Pension Plan Consultations (1996)). 
  2 my before period and 1990 and 1991 as my after period. I excluded the year of the policy 
change from the analysis in order to remove the transitory phase for the new eligibility 
criteria. I restrict my attention to males between the ages of 45 and 64 during my study 
period. 
 
  The difference-in-difference estimator proceeds by estimating the following 
linear probability model with ordinary least squares (OLS) (with White’s adjustment to 
the standard errors) 
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where  denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals who do not 
participate in the labor force and 0 otherwise, x is a vector of controls for observable 
characteristics (containing dummy variables for age, marital status and education) as well 
as  the provincial unemployment rate for prime age males (25 to 44), which controls for 
differences in labor markets and economic conditions across time and provinces. CPP is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the CPP provinces and 0 otherwise, it 
controls for differences in nonparticipation due to location. I define the dummy variable 
After to take the value 1 in the years after the policy change in 1989 and 0 otherwise.
NP
3 
This dummy variable controls for time effects on nonparticipation. Finally, the term 
CPP*After is an interaction term between CPP and After. The coefficient estimate on this 
interaction term is the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the policy change 
on labor force nonparticipation. This estimate captures the effect of being covered by the 
CPP program, relative to being covered by the QPP program, after the less stringent 
eligibility criteria were implemented in the CPP disability program.
4 
 
  Recently, a number of papers have noted that the standard errors for difference-in-
difference estimators may be biased downwards because they do not account for the 
grouped nature of the data (Donald and Lang (2001) and Wooldridge (2003)). In order to 
correct the difference-in-difference estimates I used a 2-step approach suggested by 
Wooldridge (2003).
5 Wooldridge’s approach separates variables that vary at the 
individual and group level, with equation (1) being rewritten as  
 
) 2 ( , ~
it g it it v x NP + + ′ =φ β  
 
where φ  is a set of group specific intercepts for each different geographic area (CPP or 
QPP) for each of the years in the study period. There will be eight elements in the 
g
                                                 
3 I restricted the ‘after’ period to end in 1991 because the CPP program allowed for late applicants for 
benefits beginning in 1992, which made a number of individuals who were previously ineligible, eligible 
for benefits (Campolieti and Lavis (2000)). Similarly, the ‘before’ period does not include years prior to 
1987 because there was a large increase in CPP disability benefits during that year. 
4 Unfortunately, the SCF does not include any measures of health or disability status. Consequently, I, like 
Gruber (2000) who also used the SCF, cannot include these factors in my nonparticipation equation. 
5 This approach is equivalent to the approaches used in Loeb and Bound (1996) and Baker and Fortin 
(2001). 
  3 parameter vector φ . The estimates of the group specific intercepts are then used to 
estimate the following regression 
After
 
φ ˆ on  1 , (3)  After CPP CPP UR * , , , ,
 
i.e., the φ s are regressed on the variables that only vary at the group level. Wooldridge 
(2003) refers to this approach as a minimum distance estimator. However, Wooldridge 
notes that to obtain an efficient minimum distance estimator the standard errors (se) for 
the group-specific intercepts should be used as weights, i.e., 1/se(φ )
g
g
2. The two-step 
estimates, i.e., efficient minimum distance estimates, of the participation equation will be 
more efficient than the OLS estimates of equation (1) (Wooldridge (2003)).  
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The estimates from the first stage of Wooldridge’s approach are presented in 
Table 1. The controls for the observable individual characteristics (see Table 1) had signs 
that were consistent with a priori expectations.  
 
The estimates in Table 2 are from the group level regression. The difference-in-
difference (d-in-d) estimate, i.e., the interaction term between the control for the CPP 
regions and the dummy variable After, was 0.015 and it was statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. This suggests that allowing individuals to use socioeconomic conditions 
to qualify for disability benefits in the CPP program reduced the labor supply of older 
men in Canada by 1.5 percentage points in provinces covered by the CPP disability 
program relative to Quebec, which had no change in its eligibility requirements. 
6  
 
The impact of the policy change on nonparticipation decisions is similar to the 
estimates in Gruber (2000). Gruber (2000) examined the effect of 36 percent increase in 
CPP benefits in 1987, relative to QPP benefits that did not change, and obtained estimates 
that suggested increases in the probability of nonparticipation for men aged 45 to 59 
between 1.8 to 2.3 percent points in the CPP provinces. Gruber was able to convert these 
estimates into (arc) elasticities for benefits between 0.19 and 0.36. This suggests that 
using much slacker screening requirements can also have a large effect on the 
participation decisions of older males comparable to large benefit increases. Similarly, 
Gruber and Kubik (1997) examined the effect of increases in denial rates for disability 
insurance programs on labor force participation of older men in the United States. Their 
principal estimates suggest statistically significant denial rate elasticity for 
nonparticipation of –0.28. Using their elasticity estimate, my estimate for the effect of the 
                                                 
6 In order to examine the robustness of the results I also conducted a falsification exercise, which checks 
the sensitivity of the results for pre-existing trends. I picked 1982 as my before period and 1983 as my after 
period, since there were no changes in CPP or QPP policy during those years that would have impacted the 
labor force participation of older men in Canada. However, these estimates could not be obtained with 
Wooldridge’s method so a variant of equation (1) was estimated with OLS. The difference-in-difference 
estimates from the counterfactual exercise was 0.009 and had a standard error of 0.015 and not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.573). This indicates that there were no pre-existing trends in the data. 
  4 less stringent screening CPP disability program requirements on nonparticipation implies 
a 23 percent fall in denial rates at the initial stage.  
 
These estimates imply that the screening requirements can have a large effect on 
the participation decisions of older males and so have large effect on flows onto the 
disability rolls. This points to problems inherent in having eligibility criteria that do not 
focus exclusively on medical criteria to determine which applicants are granted benefits. 
The experience of the caseload growth of the CPP disability program in the late-1980s 
until 1995 illustrates the potential consequences of these looser screening requirements 
coupled with more generous benefits. In particular, there was a steady increase in the 
number of applications to the CPP disability, as well as new beneficiaries, to the CPP 
disability program but very little variation in the QPP program during this period (see 
Campolieti and Lavis (2000). However, after the CPP program began to reform its 
application’s process, which included not allowing socioeconomic conditions to qualify 
for benefits in 1995, there was large drop in applications to the program and new 
beneficiaries as well as increases in denial rates for applicants to the CPP disability 
program. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
I estimated the effect of a change in eligibility criteria that allowed socioeconomic 
criteria to be used to qualify for disability benefits on the labor force participation of 
older workers. My estimates suggest that this policy change had a fairly large effect on 
the labor force participation of older males in Canada. They also point to the problem of 
using non-medical conditions to determine eligibility for disability benefits, which can 
affect individual labor supply decisions and lead to hidden unemployment on the 
disability rolls.  
  5  
References  
 
Autor, D.H. and M.G. Duggan (2003) ‘The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in 
Unemployment’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 157-205. 
 
Baker, M and N. Fortin (2001) ‘Occupational and Gender Composition in Wages in 
Canada, 1987-1988’ Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 345-376. 
 
Bound, J. and R.V. Burkhauser (1999) ‘Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs 
Targeted on People with Disabilities’ in Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3 by O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card., Eds., North Holland:Amsterdam, 3417-3528. 
 
Campolieti, M. and J.N. Lavis (2000) ‘Disability Expenditures in Canada, 1970-1996: 
Trends, Reform Efforts and a Path for the Future’ Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de 
Politiques 26, 241-246. 
 
Canada Pension Plan Consultations (1996). An Information Paper for the Consultations 
on the Canada Pension Plan. Ottawa: Department of Finance. 
 
Donald, S.G. and K. Lang (2001) ‘Inference with Difference-in-Difference and Other 
Panel Models’ mimeograph, Boston University, Department of Economics. 
 
Gruber, J. and J. Kubik (1997) ‘Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor 
Supply of Older Workers’ Journal of Public Economics 64, 1-23 
 
Gruber, J. (2000) ‘Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply’ Journal of Political 
Economy 108, 1162-1183. 
 
Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) (1996). Evaluation of the Canada 
Pension Plan (Disability Component). 
 
Loeb, S. and J. Bound (1996) ‘The Effect of Measured School Inputs on Academic 
Achievement: Evidence from the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s Birth Cohorts’ Review of 
Economics and Statistics 78, 653-664. 
 
Torjman, S. (2002). The Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefit. Report prepared for the 
Office of the Commissioner of Review Tribunals Canada Pension Plan/Old Age Security. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2003) ‘Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics’ American 
Economic Review, forthcoming. 
  6 Table 1: First Stage Estimates, OLS 
 
  Coefficient Estimates  Standard Errors 
[Age 60-64] 
Age 45-49  -0.282***  0.006 
Age 50-54  -0.252***  0.006 
Age 55-59  -0.148***  0.007 
Married -0.107***  0.007 
[No Schooling or Elementary Education]  
Grade 9-10  -0.082***  0.007 
Grade 11-13  -0.131***  0.006 
Some Post Secondary  -0.177***  0.008 
Post Secondary Diploma  -0.169***  0.008 
University Degree  -0.232***  0.008 
Group Specific Intercepts    
1987 and CPP=0   0.589*** 0.015 
1987 and CPP=1  0.557*** 0.009 
1988 and CPP=0   0.579*** 0.014 
1988 and CPP=1  0.557*** 0.010 
1990 and CPP=0   0.622*** 0.012 
1990 and CPP=1  0.604*** 0.009 
1991 and CPP=0   0.628*** 0.012 
1991 and CPP=1  0.614*** 0.009 
    
R-squared  0.325 
Sample Size  35,964 
    
 
Notes: Excluded reference category in square brackets. Standard errors computed using 
White’s adjustment for heteroskedasticity. Group specific intercepts are for different 
regions and years, CPP=1 denotes CPP provinces and CPP=0 denotes Quebec. Triple 
asterisk denotes significant at the 1 percent level. 
  7   8 
Table 2: Efficient Minimum Distance Estimates of Nonparticipation Equation 
 
  Coefficient Estimate  Standard Error 
Prime Age Male 
Unemployment Rate 
0.354* 0.196 
After 0.036***  0.006 
CPP -0.027***  0.005 
After*CPP 0.015**  0.007 
Constant 0.549***  0.020 
   
R-squared 0.990 
Number of Groups  8 
   
 
Notes: Single asterisk denotes statistically significant at 10 percent level, double asterisk 
denotes statistically significant at 5 percent level and triple asterisk denotes statistically 
significant at 1 percent level.  